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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The city of Tientsin is situated in northern China at the junc tion
of the Peiho (River) and th e Yuho (the Grand Canal).

Its latitude is

approximately 39 degrees north with a longitude of about 117 degrees
1
The unique thing about Tientsin in 1900 was that it was ac -

east.

tually two totally separate cities.

Tientsin City , or the Native City,

was surrounded by a large wall built in 1405.
feet thick and about twenty-five feet high.

The wall was about thirty
The sides of i t were faced

wjth brick work four to five feet thick and the center was filled with
dirt .

A brick parapet about five feet high capped the wall, and gates

were situated in the center of each side.

Over these gates and in the

four corners were built two storied buildings which served as look-out

stations and added a very ornamental effect.
Native City were very close together.

The streets were narrow, and

transit and public utilities were very poor.
1

Noah F. Drake ,

11

Buildings inside the

2

Outside the walls of the

Map and Short Description of Tientsin," (unpub-

lished printed booklet, in Stanford University Library), p. 1. H. B.
Morse in The International Rel ations of the Chinese Empire, 3 vols.
(London: Longmans Green and Co., 1918), 1:241, on map lists the river
as the Haiho.
2

Gordon Casserly, The Land of the Boxers: Or China Under the
All i es (London: Green and Company, 1903), p. 17.

Native City were extensive suburbs in which a large pa rt of the native

population lived.

Surrounding the suburbs of t he Native City was a mud

wall which had been construc t ed in 1858 as a defense against for.

e~gners.

3

Two miles down the Peiho was si tuated the Tientsin Foreign City .
It resembled a European town rather than an alien settlement in th e
heart of the Chine se Empire.

It had wide roads and well kept streets,

lar ge offices and huge warehou ses.

It also had good publi c buildings

and comfortable villas, a horse racing track and a polo ground.

The

city hall, known as Gordon Hall, named for General Charles Gordon who
laid out the British Concession, was the leading architectural struc ture in the foreign city .

Vict oria Park was a beautiful area which

had been developed within a treeless, marshy, alkaline area of the
foreign city.

Most of the buildings in the area were located in those

parts of the concession closest to the river.

In 1900 only the British,

French, Japanese and Germans had concess ions in Tientsin.

4

Most of the

ba nks and o ffices of the largest merchants were located in the British
concession.

5

By 1900 Tientsin had approximately one million people and because
it was a center for tr ade, it had become an impor tant city to China,

both politically and economically.

Its growth to political importance

3
Henry Neil, Startling Experiences in the Three Wars; in China , the
Ph i lippines, South Africa (Chicago: Marshall Everett, 1900) , pp . 85- 86.
4

5

or a ke, "Map and Short Description of Tientsin, " pp . 2-3.

casserly, The Land of the Boxers, p. 17.

apparently dates back to the f i r st year of the reign of the Ming emperor
Yung-lo, in 1403.

At that time it became a wei, or fortified post.

In

the third year of Yung Ching, 1726, it became a chou, or sub-perfectoral
city, six years later becoming

of Chihli.

6

a~'

or capital city of the province

Economically, the city had been important as a trade

center for over a thousand years.

It was not until 1863 that the area was opened to foreign trade,
the British becoming the first foreign power to become active there.

From that time on foreign activity in the area increased.

In 1900 that

influence was to be seriously challenged by a Chinese anti-foreign movement known as the Boxers.

It is the purpose of this paper to analyze

the influence of the foreigners in Tientsin, show how this influence
added to the Boxers' anti-foreign feeling, and narrate the events that

occurred as a result of this collision of two cultures.

The sources

for this paper are English language materials written by foreigners,
and thereby, run the risk of being partial to foreign interests.

Even

with this in mind, it will be made clear that the integrity of the
Chinese and the respect which they deserved from the foreign in trud ers
was almost totally ignored during and after the Boxer uprising.

The

fight by the armed forces of the powers to put down the Boxers gave the
foreigners a ready excuse to further their influence around Tientsin.

This imperialistic lack of respect shown by the powers for China and
the Chinese becomes the principal theme of this paper.
6

orake, "Map and Short Description of Tientsin, " p . 1.

CHAPTER II
FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN TIENTSIN, 1900

The biggest foreign influence in and around the city of Tientsin
was in the area of trade.

Tientsin, because of its geographic location

had for years been a major trading center in China.

This was due to

the sys tem of navigable waterwa ys branching from Tientsin, especially

the Grand Canal, built over 1300 years ago .

At an early date Tientsin

had become a flourishing trade center, with the transferring of cargoes
the most frequent form of employment of the people in the city. 1

The

fact that it was the port city of Peking helped contribute to the volume of trade .

From about March 10 to about November 20, when the water-

ways froze over, Tientsin was a bustling city, the trade outlet for the
whole of the northwestern provinces of China.

The ten to twelve miles

of waterway within the city were filled with riverboats, with thousands

of Chinese filling the walkways of the trading area, carrying bundles
of commerce to and from boats.

2

It was this potential for trade that made the Tientsin area

es -

pecially enticing to the greedy foreign merchants, who were by 1900 a
major influence in the area.

The first foreign concessions were not

granted, however, until after the ratifying of the Treaty of Tientsin

in 1860.
1

2

In accordance with the terms of the treaty, the Chinese

orake, "Map and

Ibid ., p. 2.

!hart Description of Tientsin ," p. 1.

superintendent of Northern Trade laid out three tracts of land.

These

tracts were to be for the us e of British, French and American residents~
The British concession was th e f irs t to have its boundaries laid, that

taking place in December 1860.
Jun e 1861.

The French concession was granted in

It was located just above the British concession .

The

United States never did take active jurisdiction over the area set

aside for it, though some Americans bought property within the area
directly from Chinese owners.

4

On October 12, 1880 the area was rele-

gat e d to its former status, "with t he understanding that if at some

future time it shall become desirable to establish suitable municipal
re gulations there i n it shall be competent for the consular authority to

do so."

On June 25, 1896 the United States officially abandoned all

rights to any jurisdiction in Ti entsin, an a ct that was later to be re-

gretted . 5
What e ver disdain shown by the United States for gaining land in
Chin a previous to 1900 was made up for by Britain, France and lat e r
Ge rmany and Japan.

Britain gained c ontrol of additional land on March

31, 1897, the new territory be coming known as the "extra concession. "

The term extra-concession was somewhat a misnomer since the new area
3

rnspectorate General of Customs, Decennial Reports on the Trade ,
Navigation , Industries , etc . , of the Ports Open to Foreign Commerce

in China and Corea, and on the Condition and Development of the Treaty
Port Provinces, 1892- 1901 (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1902).
4
5

Ibid . , p. 575.

u.

ington:

S. Department of State, U. S. Foreign Relations , 1901 (WashGovernment Printing Office, 1901), p. 50.

was not granted in perpetuity such as was acquired in the original concession .

The old American concession was also turned over to Britain

and became known as the "British Southern Extension. " 6

In April 1896

a morement was started by France to expand the area of its concession .
Two problems faced agreement to the expansion .
vince the Chinese to agree to it.

One, France had to con-

Two, British subjects lived within

the area desired by France, and Britain sought to protect the rights
of these citizens .

troubles.

Action was not taken on this until after the Boxer

7

The original German concession was not made until an agreement

was reached with the Chinese on October 30, 1895.
south of the British Southern Extension .

It skirts the Peiho

The terms of the lease were

the usual lease in perpetuity, subject only to the payment of a land
.
8
tax, as was the case in the other cmcess 1ons.

only other concession open before 1900.

The Japanese had the

In the protocol signed between

Japan and China at Peking October 19, 1896, authority was given for
settlements for the exclusive use of Japan in all the Chinese Treaty
ports.

In accordance with this provision, a strip of land was set

aside for the Japanese. 9
Thus a rather large portion of a rea in the immediate vicinity of
Tien tsin was under the control of foreign powers.

6
7
8
9

nccennial Reports, 1892-1901, p. 574.
Ibid., p. 576 .
Ibid .

Ibid., p. 577.

Other countries such

Figure 1.

Foreign Concession in Tientsin.

as Belgium, Austria, Russia md Italy were showing increased interest in

obtaining a piece of the action for themselves.

The United States,

though not holding control of land, had a commercial representative at
Tientsin.

\·lith the growing importance of the interests of the various

foreign powers in Tientsin, several of the home governments took steps

to recognize the development of trade by raising the status of their
consuls in Tientsin from the position of consulate to consulate

general.

10

Because trade was by far the largest influence foreigners had in
Tientsin, a brief s ummary of the most important goods for trade is in
order here.

By 1900, cotton piece goods had become the largest arti-

cle of foreign import into Tientsin.

England and the United States led

in amounts imported, with the United States representing about half of

this branch of the trade.

11

Japan and India also sold cotton in Tient-

sin, with United Sta t es (U. S.) goods considered to be superior to all
others.

Chinese preferred them to all others because they dyed better .

Also, because freight from New York was usually cheaper than charges
from England on similar goods, U. S. cloth was less expensive to the
Chinese .

Yet another factor was the advancement of U. S. technology

which had developed what was known as the Northrup Automatic Loom.
This made it possible for American factories to use only one man per
twenty looms while in England it was a one man to four loom ratio. 12
lOibid., pp. 572 -73 .
11

u. S. Congr ess, House, Commercial Relations of the United States
with Foreign Countries during the year 1899, H. Doc. 481, pt 1, 56th
Cong., 1st sess., p. 854.
12

necennial Reports, 1892-1901, p. 533.

Thus the American manufacturer in competition with his English counterpart saved much in the amount spent for wages .
Kerosene and sugar were also impo rtant imports into Tientsin .

These came mostly from the United States and Russia. 13

The most impor-

tant sundries imported were sugar, matches (mostly from Japan),
wines and liquors, cigarettes, needles and hardware.

14

A large percen-

tage of goods coming to Tientsin from the United States were not brought
directly, but came to China at Shanghai and Hong Kong, and were then
brought to Tientsin .

There was a great competition among the foreign

countries in the import trade.

United States Consul James W. Ragsdale

called for his country to improve its trade.

He said this could be

done only" . .. by sending good, live and responsible Americans," to

handl e the trade instead of relying on foreign agents.

He pointed out

that Germany was preparing to send her own agents, and was also preparing to publish a paper in the Chinese language to advertise their
16
product.
Ragsdale also pointed out that United States manufactured
goods were constantly being counterfeited.

Such items as Fairbanks

scales and Columbia bicycles were being made by the Japanese and sold
in China for about half t he price of the genuine ar t icle.

Germany also

l3u . S . Congress, Commercial Relations 1899, p . 855.
14

oecennial Reports, 1892-1901, p. 533.

15

u. S. Congress, House, Cons~lar Reports, September 1898, H. Doc
565 , pt. , 1, 55th Gong., 2d sess, Vol. LVIII , No. 216, p. 554.
16

Ibid. , p. 555.

10
got into the counterfeiting act by making a graphophone and sel ling
it in Tientsin as a genuine Edison.

indeed a poor imitation,

Consul Ragsdale described it as

1117

Although the import trade was large and important, the export business was distinctly the most significan t and characteristic of Tientsin.

From 1891 to 1900 the export trade from Tientsin had doubled, despite
some ve ry unfavorable conditions.
were:

In 1900, the seven leading exports

l) sheep's wool, 2) goat skins, 3) straw braid, 4) coal, 5)

bris tl es, 6) skin rugs of goat, sheep and lamb, and 7) ground nuts. 18
Most of these goods came from the province of Lanchau, on the borders

of Tibet, and the province of Hsi-Ning, further to the northeast.

The

goods came down the Yellow River, and through the Khaupingkhau and
Nankhou passes, both of which were dominated from Peking. 19

In the

native city of Tientsin could be found such items as choice silks, or
rich furs from Manchuria and Korea.

20

Thus it was trade that was the biggest mterest to foreigners and
their governments, and trade that brought most fore i gners to Tientsin .

As co uld be expected, those outsiders who invaded China after 1860 were
not content simply to engage in activities related to trade.

Foreign

influence in Tientsin by 1900 was being felt in many other ways.

Some

of this influence was of a positive nature in that it tended to improve

17
18

Ibid.
oecennial Reports. 1892-1901, p. 553.

19
H. Thompson, China and t he Powers , A Narrative of the Outbreak of
1900 (London: Longmans and Green and Co., 1902), p. 141.
20

casserly, Land of the Boxers, p. 18.

11

living conditions.

For the most part, however, any improvements that

were made were in the area of the Tientsin foreign city, and were certainly of no real value to the Chinese themselves, unless , of course,

they were employed in the fore i gn city and were able to take advantage
of any convenience afforded them beca use of where they worked.

An ex-

ample of modern improvements in 1900 was the construction of a new

water system, the pipes being sent to Tientsin from New York.
new gas works was constructed.

21

around the foreign settlements.

Also a

Both of these served mainly the area
Further improvements included the

planting of trees and the improving of streets.
Foreign influence and pressure was especially strong regarding the
problem of silting in the waterways near Tientsin.

the Peiko had been decreasing since 1890.

Volume of water in

The river had been deep,

with a rapid current, and ocean going steamers were able to come right
up to the foreign settlements to unload their cargoes.

22

But because

of factors of geology and extensive canal and irrigation projects,

built mostly after 1890, the river's volume was steadily decreasing.
Geology was a factor in that the rivers of northern China contain large
deposits of sediments, which rapidly fill the Gulf of Pechili into
which the Peiho flows.

This causes a natural lessening in depth of

water which caused pr oblems to larger ffiips traveling the area.

Wi t h

the advent of new canals and irrigation works, the water levels were

further diminished. 2 3

By 1900, the larger vessels wer e forced to stay

21
U. S . Congress, Consular Reports 1898, p. 551 .
22
23

Ibid.
orake, "Map and Short Description of Tinetsin," p. 1.

12
outside of the shallow bar at Taku, 13 miles out to sea.

The goods of

these ships had to be unloaded ont o tugs and barges, so as to make the
trip up to Tinetsin, creating much more expense for shippers.

In 1898,

foreign shippers began demanding that consular officials lead a movement to gain access to the necessary funds to do something about the
problem.

It was determined that $162,500 would be necessary to im-

prove the waterways.

Of this amount, the Viceroy of Chihli agreed

to provide $65,000, and the consular bodies secured the remainder by
means of a loan which was to be repaid from monies received from a

newly levied landing tax, by authority of the French and English munic ipalities.
24

The scheme had the approval of the diplomatic body of

Peking.

Schools in and around Tientsin were definitely under foreign influence .

In the 1880's, Commissioner of Customs at Tientsin, Gustav

Detring, persuaded Viceroy Li Hung-chang to give his sanction for the
acquisition of a tract of land below the foreign settlement for the
purpose of building a university.

Funds were contributed by Chinese

officials and Europeans, and in 1887 the main building of what became
known as Tientsin University was erected. 25

But, Viceroy Li had a

change of heart and refused to let the university open.

It thus stood

vacant for eig ht years and became known as "Detring's folly."

24
U. S . Congress, Consular Reports, 1898, p. 551.
25

From Charles D. Tenney, "The Government Schools of Chihli
Province," quoted in Decennial Reports 1892-1901, p. 566.

13
Dr. Charles D. Tenney, who had been a United States Vice-consul to
Tientsin, and who had organized a private school for Chinese you ths,

became president of the new university 1895, after the war with Japan
had changed the minds of Chinese officials.
began its operation.

Thus Tientsin University

26

The curriculum at the new university was based totally on European
concepts.

quired.

Four years of preparatory English and nnthematics were re-

After those four years, the student advanced to the col legiate

level or advanced study.

The last three years study, the students

could choose to specialize
engineering.

in either European law or in a branch of

The students were admitted to the various departments by

competitive examinations .

In each area of specialization a foreign

professor was in charge, assisted by Chinese professors.

The govern-

rnent of the university was solely in the hands of the president and two
Chinese directors .

Total budget of the university in 1898 was $39,000,

all of which was paid by the Chinese government.
attended the university.

27

In 1898, 250 students

The Chinese rejected until after 1900 a

scheme to open foreign influenced preparatory schools in the surround -

ing area.

It would have been the purpose of these schools to get stu-

dents r eady to attend Tientsin University .

The influence of foreigners

in the educational system nea r Tientsin was to be of s upr eme importance

in the coming of th e Boxer uprising, for it attacked the very fiber of
26

rbid., pp. 556-5 7.

p. 551. - -

Also discussed in Consular Report s , 1898,

27Discussed in bo t h Decennial Reports , 1892-1901 , p. 569 and
Consular Reports , 1898 , pp. 551-52.

14
traditional Chinese culture.

Charles Tenney himself said that "When

the Boxers took charge of affairs in Chihli, they gave out as their
programme at Tientsin, first, the destruction of the railway station,

and, second, that of the University." 28
Had it not been for the foreign influence, railroads would not
even have been in China in 1900.

The double line of track between

Tientsin and Peking had just been completed in 1899 (actually the line
stopped at Machaipu, just outside the walls of the capital).

On the

seawa rd side of Tientsin were twenty-seven miles of single track reaching as far as Tangku, almost due east.

This line was extremely impor-

tant as a trade route because of the problem of low water in the river

routes.

29

Thus Tientsin was an important railroad center.

Although

the Chinese government controlled the management of the main lines, it

was the foreigners who were responsible for their presence in China,
since it was from the outside that capital and know how was gained to

build the railroads.
tion to the Boxers.

30

The railroads became a symbol of foreign exploitaIt was for this reason that some of the earliest

Boxer activities near Tientsin were aimed at the railroad lines and
sta tions.

The realm of

foreign influence that was the initial spark in set-

ting off the Boxer movement were the Christian missionary activities
28

From Tenney, "Government Schools," quoted in Decennial Reports,

1892-1901, p. 567.
29
30

U. S. Congress, Commercial Relations

1899, p. 867.

chester C. Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe (New York:
and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 55.

W. W. Norton

15
in China.

Missionary activity was prominent in and around Tientsin .

As an example, a new Roman Catholic cathedra l had been completed in the
native city of Tientsin in 1897.

A large Methodist Episcopal church

had been built in the foreign city of Tientsin.

31

Jesuit and Lazarist

missionaries owned much of the property within the French sector of
the foreign city.

32

Although much of the mission activity and result-

ing violence took place in the outlying areas of Shantung and Chihli
provinces, there is no doubt that the negative influences were felt

within Tientsin.

A notice written by the Boxers and widely distributed

in Tientsin clearly shows the attitude of the Boxers towards the Christian religion as applied to the Chinese culture.

It read as follows:

On account of the protestant and Catholic religions, the

Buddhist gods are oppressed, and our sages thrust into the
background. The law of Buddha is no longer respected and the
five relationships are disregarded. The anger of Heaven and
Earth has been aroused and the timely rain has been consequently withheld from us. But heaven is now sending down
eig ht millions of spiritual soldiers to extirpate these
foreign religions, and when this is done there will be a
timely rain. In a short time there will be an encounter of
weapons, and the soldiers and people will suffer calamity.
People ought to hasten to join the Buddhist faith as soon as
possible. The Yi Ho Tuan can protect the government and give
peace and protection to the people, and parents and people
having seen this notice must make it known to others and thus
avoid calamity to their families. Those who fail to publish
it will suffer. If the foreign religions are not destroyed
there will be no rain.33
31
Frederick Brown, From Tientsin to Peking with the Allied Forces
(London : Charles H. Kelly, 1902), p. 45.
32
33

Thompson, China and The Powers, p. 136.
Peking and Tientsin Times, March 3, 1900, p . 2.

16
It is obvious from this that the missionary movement of the Cahtolic and Protestant churches were considered to be the worst enemy by
the Boxers.

And Tientsin itself was influenced by the foreign re~

ligions.
It is apparent that Tientsin came under the spell of the foreigners in many ways.

It should not be surprising , therefore, that Tient-

sin should be the scene of some of the fiercest and most violent
occurrences during the so-called Boxer uprising.

It was this foreign

influence that brought about the general uprising by the Chinese a gainst the foreign intruders.

And Tientsin was to play a major and

significant part in the events that took place in 1900.

17

CHAPTER III
SEIGE:

THE BOXERS IN TIENTSIN

The first reports of the l Ho Ch'uan, known as the Boxers to
Westerners, were in 1898.

Most of the disturbances created by the

Boxers were in the area of the southern border between Shantung and

Chihli provinces.

1

From there the movement spread eventually to the

very confines of Tientsin itself.

As early as December, 1899, the

United States Consul to Tientsin, J. W. Ragsdale, had been in touch with
Yu Lu, Viceroy of Chihli, concerning the Boxers.

When Boxer activity

increased in Chihli, Ragsdale demanded that Yu Lu do something to suppress that activity.

Yu Lu immediately issued a proclamation ordering

the Boxers to stop causing problems, but these were immediately torn
2
down.
Ragsdale was unhappy because he felt the de tachments sen t to
carry out Yu Lu's proclamation were too sma ll.

At any rate, the de-

tachments were quite ineffectual, and the Boxers were able to continue

to ca us e problems. 3
The Boxer movement continued to grow and on December 5 , 1899,
the North China Daily News ran an article which predic t ed that unless
something was done, terror and threat to foreign lives would continue.

1

Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe, p. 52.

2

u. S . Congress, House, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations
of the United States with the Annual Message of the President, H. Doc.
1, 76th Gong., 2d sess . , p. 268.
3

Ibid.

18
It also called for stronger action in dealing with the Boxers and said,
"There is but one method of successfully dealing with such risings ,
which is to put them out before they have made headway." 4

By January

the Tientsin and Peking Times reported that a serious Boxer outbreak
had occured in Chinghai, only twenty-five miles from Tientsin.

It also

reported that it had learned that the Boxers were organizing within the
confines of Tientsin Native City.

5

A week later the paper was calling

for the sending of gunboats to North China by the Western powers to
combat the Boxers.

The press was severely critica l of the Chinese

Government, which it accused of not doing enough to control the situation .

6

The foreigners living in the outlying districts of Tientsin were
contin ually bombarding the consular officials with demands to do something .

Despite pleas by officials the violence continued .

the foreign ministers were themselves subject to criticism.

However,
Francis

Lister Hawkes Pott, a missionary to northern China, claimed that the

foreign officials were" . .. too dazzled by the glamour of an Oriental
court, and have never shown the least indication of having grasped the
situation ."
4

7

Feelings were running high, and members of the foreign

North China Daily News, 5 December 1899, p . 1.
5
Tientsin and Peking Times, 13 January 1900 , p. 182.
6
Tientsin and Pekine, Times, 20 January 1900, p. 189.
7
Francis Lister Pott, The Outbreak in China, Its Caus es (New
York: J. Pott and Co., 1900), p. 84 .

19
establishment throughout northern China were becoming quite edgy and
frightened.

By the early part of March 1900, the Boxers were reported

to be seen actively drilling inside the walls of the Native City.

It

was also reported that a large percentage of governmen t officials were

secretly encouraging the Boxers . 8
By the end of May Consul Ragsdale had come to the conc lusio n that
the Boxers were becoming a serious threat to the foreign settlements.

The Native City was by this time seriously affected by Boxer activity.
Ragsdale was so concerned that on May 27, 1900 he sent a message to
United States Admiral Louis Kempff, who was Commander of the U. S.
Flagship, Newark, requesting aid.

The message was telegraphed to

Tangku a nd from there sent to Taku by tug, reaching the admiral at
a .m., May 28.

Contents of the message were as follows:

Sir: Part of the railway to Paoting fu destroyed by
Boxers last evening . Three stations already burned. Destruction of main line to Peking threatened, workshops and

several stations f rom Peking already destroyed. Boxers are
in control and stations deserted by agents and employees.
Viceroy promises to send troops t omo rrow morning, but I have

doubts as to their reliability.

There is great uneasiness

here amongst the foreigners, and their situation is most
serious. Can't you land a force of marines with Maxim or

quick firing guns? If so, bring by rail if permitted,
otherwise by river.9
Admiral Kempff acted immediately and ordered 100 men to go to Tientsin
under the command of Captain B. H. McCalla.

These troops reached

Tientsin at 10 p.m . May 28 and were the first group of foreign troop
8
9

Tientsin and Peking Times, 3 March 1900, p. 2.

u.

S. Congress, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, p. 270.

20

reinforcements to arrive at the Foreign City.

Ragsdale reported that

the forei gners at Tientsin were so happy to see them that the ent ir e
foreign population of the city went out to greet them, complete with a
brass band.

Two days later 56 of the 100 were sent on to Peking to help

protect that city from the Boxers.

10

On June 8, Consul Ragsdale sent his native writer into the Native
City to obtain some kind of idea of what was taking

~ace

there.

On

his return, the writer reported that there was much excitement within

the Native City.

He told of blacksmiths working around the clock to

make spears, and that they were receiving three times

usually received for them.

11

the amount they

Consul Ragsdale interpreted his writer's

report to be a signal of impending crisis.

He therefore petitioned

Admiral Kempf£ for more manpower, which was again granted.

But due to

the seriousness of the situation in Peki ng, it was decided to send 800
of the troops at Tientsin to Peking.

This was done only after much

controversy, for many of the foreign body at Tientsin saw a dire need

for them to r emain.

These troops left Tientsin on July 10 under the

command of Admiral Sir Edward Seymour of the British Naval force .

The

Seymour Expedition immediately aroused the Boxers who so successfully
harrassed Seymour's troops that they never did reach Peking. 12
Rumors and fears of an attack by the Boxers on the foreign establishments were very strong by the second week of June.
10
11
12

Ibid., p. 268.
rbid.' p. 270.

Tan, The Boxer Catastrophe, p. 70.

The situation

21
was becoming so serious that the Chinese servants of the British con-

cession had been gradually disappearing since the beginning of the
month.

13

At 3 o'clock on the morning of July 15, groups of Boxers made up
of men and boys set fires in several places on the immediate outskirts

of the foreign settlements.

Groups of these men and boys could be

seen in the moonlight carrying torches, shavings and oil.

As they carne

near the foreign settlements, they tried to set fire to everything they
could, the entire time yelling as hideously as possible. 14

All the

sailors and soldiers available in the foreign quarter went instantly into action.

Even Consul Ragsdale and two of his sons, one of whom was

only fifteen years old, took part in the first engagernent. 15

Most of

the foreigners were equipped with rifles but in two places the Boxers
were fired upon with machine guns.

The Boxers made a concerted effort

to raid the Tientsin railroad station which was only a short distance

from the foreign settlements.
a large group of Russians.
Tientsin-Peking Times
Boxers "like rabbits."

The station was guarded at the time by

William McLeish, a news reporter for the

reported that the Russian gunners shot down the
When he dared venture out after the firing

stopped, McLeish counted several "peaceful villagers" among the dead.
13
Letter from British Consul Carles to the British Foreign Office,
28 June 1900, in Great Britain Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting the Disturbances in China (London: Harrison and Sons, 1901), p. 91.
14
wuliam McLeish, "Tientsin Beseiged and After the Seige: A
Daily Record," (unpublished booklet in Hoover Library, Stanford Uni versity), p. 1.
15
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They had apparently ventured out to inquire about the disturbance and
were caught in the fire.

16

The events of June 15 certainly played a major role in the future
action of the Boxers, and perhaps more important , the Chinese Imperial

army.

Prior to June 15, the Imperial troops were under orders to con -

tain the violence of the Boxers.

General Shih-ch'eng Nieh , whose army

numbered 6,000 and who had been sent out to protect the railroad lines
from destruction, was called back to Tientsin .

His troops arrived

just a few hours before the Boxers began their fires and rush on the
foreign settlements.

17

It was also known that Generals Yu - k'un Ma and

Ch'ing Sung were in the area of Tientsin and commanded rather large
numbers of Imperial troops.

There was no evidence that any of these

troops played active roles in the June 15 attack on the foreign settlements, but the killing of several Chinese citizens, several of whom were
merely peaceful onlookers, adversely affected the attitude of the
Chinese leaders toward the foreigners.
The very next night an event took place that was even more important in forming Chinese attitudes and policies toward the foreigners.

For on the night of June 16, 1900 the foreign admirals at Taku made the
decision to attack the forts off the Taku Bar .

An exerpt from the

minutes of the meeting held by the foreign admirals best typifies their
attitude toward the entire Boxer situation.
16
17

The minutes read in part :

McLeish, "Tientsin Beseiged and After the Seige ," o . 2.
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Figure 2. General map of Tientsin.
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The Allied Powers, since the beginning of the troubles,
have, without opposition, sent detachments on land to protect

their fellow-citizens and the diplomatic Corp against the
rebels known as the Boxers . At first the representatives of
the Imperial authority appeared to understand their duties
and made evident efforts looking to the re-establishment of
order; but now they clearly show their sympathy with the enemies of the Foreigners, in bringing troops toward the railway
line and in mining the entrance to the Peiho. These acts
prove that the Government is forgetting its solemn engagements
vis-a-vis Foreigners; and as the commanders of the allied
forces see the necessity of keeping in constant communication

with the detachments on land, they have decided to occupy
temporarily by consent or by force, the forts at Taku. The
latest time for their delivery to the allied forces is fixed
at two o'clock a.m. on the morning of the 17th. This shall
be communicated to both the Viceroy at Tientsin and the

Commander at the Forts.l8
The commander of the forts
of his superiors .

ans>~ered

that he was bound by the orders

Just an hour before the time limit expired, the

Chinese opened fire upon the allied gun boats.

The allies answered

this by sending six gun boats, manned by sailors and marines from
Britain, Japan, Russia, Germany, Austria and Italy to attack the

forts.

19

The attack was a success and the allies took control of the

Taku forts.

This was of extreme significance , for now Chinese

Imper-

ial troops began to take an active role in the combat against the foreigners, whereas before they had for the most part out of active participation with the Boxers.

As far as Tientsin was concerned, it

was just a s hort time before Boxers and Chinese troops alike were

attacking the city.

In fact the first shell was fired into the foreign

city the very day the Taku forts fell.
18
19

Quoted f rom Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, p. 515.
rbid., p. 516.
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Tientsin was the location of a relatively large military college,

situated only 300 yards from the foreign settlements.

In the college

facilities were stored many arms and much ammunition.

It was occupied

by 200 Chinese military students.

2

°

Consul Ragsdale became particu-

larly disturbed over the threat that the college might hold over the
foreign settlements.

Despite the fact that Generals Ma, Nieh and Sung

had their troops situated near Tientsin, the allied commanders saw no
apparent reason to take the college because Impe rial troops had not

previously acted against foreigners.
were quite alarmed.

The consula r officials, however,

Led by Consul Ragsdale, a meeting was held by the

consuls and the commanders and it was decided that the military col lege was indeed a threat and must be captured at once.

was given to begin attack on the college at

Thus, the order

3 p. m., June 17.

Before

the attack could be made, however, a shell, which was the beginning of
the seige of Tientsin, whistled into the foreign settlements .

attack on the college was promptly begun .
were fifty Chinese military students.
were all killed.

21

The

Inside the college itself

They refused to surrender and

It is Consul Ragsdale's opinion, and perhaps ri ght -

fully so, that had the allies waited a mere hour to capture the college ,
the foreign settlement may have been riddled by the eight large Krupp
guns located in the college. 22
20
21
22
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The taking of the college by no means meant that the foreign set tlements were secure.

In fact just the opposite was true.

That first

shell which dropped into the settlements at approxima t ely 2 : 30p . m.,
June 17 was just the first of many the Chinese were to fire into the beseiged foreign quarters.

Within a half-hour at least 100 more had

burst on the houses and compounds which were the homes, offices and
places of business of

fue many foreigners who had come to China to take

part in the rich trade that abounded there .

The population also in-

eluded members of the various religious orders, many of whom had recently fled to Tientsin to take refuge from the Boxers.

Also approxi-

mately 500 to 600 Chinese refugees who had been converted to Christianity and who were sure to be slaughtered if the Boxers had gotten hold
of them, had come to Tientsin.

23

The entire population was dependent

on the protection of mly about 2,500 men, 17,000 of whom were Russians
who had just arrived at Tientsin on June 17.

a defense line eight to ten miles in length.

These men had to maintain

24

A Russian, Colonel

Wogack, outranked the other foreign officers and thus assumed command.
American , Japanese, German, Russian, French and Italian troops accepted

Wogack's command.

Only the British, under the command of a naval offi-

cer, Captain C. W. Baily, were reluctant to follow the Russian's lead. 25

Hebert Ho over , who was in China as an engineer for foreign companies , and who happened to be in Tientsin when the first shells were

23
York:
24

Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover , 3 vols . (New
McMillan Co., 1951), 1:48.
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25
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fired, was asked to organize the Christian Chinese refugees to aid in

building barricades for protection.

The only materials that could be

found for this were the sacks of sugar, peanuts, rice and other grains

located in the large warehouses in the foreign city.

Approximately

1 ,000 Chinese Christians were enlisted by Hoover to pile up the sacks of
material along exposed parts of the town and at cross streets. 26

The

a tt ack of the first day of the seige, June 17, only lasted until approximately 5 p. m.

The Austrians, Italians, British and Americans kept

the enemy at a distance on the southern and western sides of the city .
The French easily drove back any enemy troops who came their way from
the north.

The wind was blowing in a southerly direction, so the French

troops set fire to the Chinese suburban homes located between the Foreign and Native cities.

The fire burned furiously all night and helped

to clear the front of enemy troops.

27

Though the foreigners would

naturally defend their action as being necessary to guarantee their
protection, it was another of a long list of examples of complete dis-

regard for the Chinese people.

The entire scene on the north of the

foreign settlements was described as truly an appalling sight.

After

dark, thousands of innocent, peaceful Chinese could be seen rushing
from their burning houses

11
•••

in the last extremity of panic."

Many

were taking away their household goods in wheel barrows, many in full
flight trying to flee shot and shell that was being played on them. 28
26
27

Ibid .

McLeish, "Tientsin Beseiged and After the Seige," pp. 3-4 .
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Losses of the Chinese the first day of the seige were unknown, but there
is no doubt that they were heavy among soldiers and the innocent were
"sac rificed in hundreds if not thousands."

The foreigners on the other

hand had only five killed, several more wounded.

29

One problem facing

the foreigners when the shelling began was where to put the women and
children so that they would be safe from attack.

It was decided that

the safest place for them would be in Gordan Hall, a large building
located in the center of the foreign community .

the city hall at the time of attack.

30

Wilfred Newberry, who was on the staff

It was being used as

The day of the initial attack,
~Herbert

the roof of the Hoover residence to look about.

Hoover, climbed onto
In a pasture about a

mile out he spotted the dairy herd that had been serving the foreigners .
Realizing the value of the cattle,he secured a horse and calmly rode
out to drive the herd back to the settlement, the entire time exposed
to heavy fire by the Chinese.
and milk for the foreigners.

The herd became valuable later for meat

31

Shelling and firing with rifle shot by the Chinese continued off
and on for the next twenty-fiv e days.

On Tuesday, June 19, the Russ-

ians, supported by the British held off a Chinese attack on the railroad station.

The temperature reached 94 degrees that day.

Chinese

shelling generally stopped about mid-afternoon while the Chinese apparently partook of their mid-afternoon tea.
29
30
31

32

32

The Chinese, with their

Ibid., p . 4.

u. S. Congress, Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, p. 270 .
Hoover, Memoirs, 1:49.

McLeish, "Tientsin Beseiged and After the Seige , " p . 5.
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superior numbers, could no doubt have overrun the foreigners, but at
no time was an all out attack carried out.

If their strategy was

suspect, the same cannot be said for the Chinese fighting ability .
Colonel Wogack stated that the Chinese were "f ighting well and more
skillfully than ever before."

33

The Russian troops bore the brunt of

the most serio us Chinese Charges, and therefore received many casual -

On June 19, ninety Russians were killed or wounded. 34

ties.

With all the fire directed at the foreign city, an increasing
number of foreigners, both soldiers and civilians were wounded.

number of medical people and facilities were extremely small .
two doctors and one nurse were available.

The

Only

A building that had served

as a settlement club was turned into a hospital by order of Colonel

Wogack.

This facility was soon full of wounded.

volunteered to help in the make-shift hospital.

Mrs . Herbert Hoover
Hoover stated that he

saw little of her during the first period of the seige, except
when she carne horne occasionally to eat or catch a little sleep ." 35

She

is said to have become quite good at riding her bicycle near the walls

of buildings, so as to avoid bullets sprayed into the city , although
one day one of her bicycle tires was punctured by a bullet. 36
Because of so many stray bullets flying into the foreign city from
the outside, ricocheting off buildings, st r eets and etc., many of the
foreigners became suspicious of the Chinese refugees.

3

\bid.

34.!M.Q_. , p. 6.
35
Hoover, Memoirs, 1:50.
36
Ibid.

These people had

30

fled to Tientsin for protection and would have been in as horrible
straits as the fo rei gners were they to be captured .

They had been

doing a tremendous service to t he community building barricades to

help protect the city.

37

Yet, many foreigners became hysterical, and

immedia t ely picked upon the Chinese in the city .

The Chinese Imperial

Bank was turned into a jail and over 100 Chinese were put in it. 38
Some were even brought to "trial" with a British captain the selfappointed "judge."

Herbert Hoover tried to intervene but was ordered

to leave .

He immediately rode his bicycle to Colonel Wogack's head-

quarters.

Wogack returned with Hoover to the scene of the "trials"

and ordered them stopped .

The Chinese prisoners were turned over to

Hoover and returned to their quarters. 39
The feelings against the Chinese did not quickly subside.

Arthur

Barnes was commander of a Chinese regiment trained by the British which
had been stationed at Wei-ha-wu.

His regiment was ordered to Tientsin

and arrived there shortly after the seige was broken.

When he arrived,

feelings were running so high against the Chinese people, that many of
the foreigners were against letting the regiment into the city. 40

Th is

despite the fact t hat at one point when it appeared a particular gun
placement was doing extreme damage, a couple of Chinese volunteered to

enter the Native City to find the gun.
37

McLeish, "Tientsin Beseiged and After the Seige ," p. 7.

38

39
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Two other Chinese volunteered

r bid . ' p. 8.
Hoover, Memoirs, 1:50.

Arthur Alisen Stuart Barnes, On Active Service of the Chinese

Regiment ; A Record of the Operations of the First Chinese Regiment in

North China from March to October 1900 (London:
pany, 1902), p. 29.

Great Richards Com-
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to try to reach Taku, but neither was heard from again.

About fifty

Chinese helped to provide ammunition for and to move a British twelvepounder naval gun.

They dragged it from one position to another, de-

pending on where it could be used for greater benefit.
this was done under heavy fire.

Several times

Chinese were also responsible for

washing approximately 400 articles per day which were used in the makeshift hospital.

Chinese women made shirts for the sick and wounded, as

well as the pillows for the hospital.

41

All in all the Chinese did a

great, and for the most part unappreciated, service for the foreign community.

From the day it began until its end twenty-five days later, the
shelling into the foreign compound was extremely heavy.
estimated that 5,000 shells were lobbed into the area .
struck the first day.

Consul Ragsdale
His hous e was

He described the shelling as" ... far more

terrific than any I experienced in the Civil War, and I served under

General Sherman."

42

Few civilians were killed because they crawled into

cellars a nd stayed there.

If one stayed below ground he was reasonably

safe, since the shells exploded as they passed through the first wall
they struck, with fragments being blown all over the first room, but not
passing through to the lower floors.
posed.

42
43

In the street, everyone was ex-

When the firing died down, those in the cellars tried to sleep

on chairs , the floor or on stairs .
41

43

Diets for those in the cellar

srown, Tientsin To Peking, pp. 42-43.
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consisted of corned beef and biscuits.

was terrific.

Damage to property in the area

Household belongings were all destroyed.

The force of

an exploding shell in one house was so great that chair le gs were

found sticking into the ceiling, while a ll of the furniture was left
in small pieces .

44

44

Ibid., p. 36 .
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CHAPTER IV
ATTACK AND DESTRUCTION

With the beginning of the attack on the foreign settlements on
June 15 , all communication with the outside was cut off.

It was im-

possible to relay word of the seriousness of the predicament of those
ca ught in the seige.

On June 19, a young Englishman named James l<a tts

volunteered to ride from Tientsin to Taku, a distance of 32 miles,

with dispatches to the British admi rals.

1

After sundown , Watts and

thr ee Russians lef t Tientsin on their dange rous journey and were somehow able to reach Taku safely.

\.Jatts ' feat was made somewhat easier

due to the fact that he was extremely familiar with the countryside. 2
The g roup ha d several narrow escapes, having to swim the Peiho twice
to avoid capture.

shot at.

3

Several times Watts and his Russian comrades were

Also on the night of June 19, a group of nine men were sent

by boat in an attemp t to reach Taku.

Among the nine was R. H. Maclay,

who was Ragsdale 's interpreter at Tientsin.

The boat had proceeded

only about nine miles down the river when it ran into rocks, apparently
placed in the river by the Boxers.

Those on board were forced to make

the rest of the journey on foot, but finally reached their destination. 4
1
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The success of the two attempts to reach the outside with infor-

mation of the plight of those at Tientsi n was to be of extreme importance.

Troops were immediately sent to the aid of the beseiged for-

eigners.

On June 22, about 200 United States Marines and 300 Russians

tried to get to the foreign city by following the railroad from the
east.

They got two miles from their destination when they were am-

bushed and forced to retreat.
skirmish.
troops.

Three Americans were killed in the

As the original group was retreating, they met 1,500 new
On June 24, the combined forces were able to make their way

int o the foreign city, much to the relief of all who had been able to
withstand the shot and shell thrown their way by the Boxers and
Chinese regulars.

The Chinese withdrew from their positions to the

east of the foreign community and en tered the walled city.
the road to Taku unobstructed.
on June 25.

5

This left

More Russian troops reached Tientsin

The next day, Admiral Seymour and what was left of his

force was led back into Tientsin by a group of Russians who had helped
Seymour's group escape from harrassment from the Boxers.

6

With the opening of the road to Taku on the twenty-fourth, and
with the arrival of more troops, it became the objective of the international force at Tientsin not only to stave off the attacks of the
Chinese, but to take the offensive themselves.

On June 26, the large

and very well equipped arsenal, three miles to the northeast of the
5
6

rbid ., p. 272.

A. Henry Savage Lander, China and the Allies, 2 vols. (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1901), 1:271.
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foreign community, was attacked by Russian troops.

They were supported

by United States Marines as well as British and German troops, and were
able to capture the arsenal, a serious blow to the Chinese . 7

On July

4, the Chinese made a strong effort to take the railway station, but a
combined British, Russian and French force repulsed the attack.
another attack was made on the railroad station July 11.

8

Yet

The fierce

fighting began at 4:00a.m., with the Chinese actually charging the
allies with bayonets fixed .

A few were able to break through between

British and French lines, and captured a number of trucks.

They were

eventually driven out, but were said to have shown an" ... astounding
amount of pluck and tenacity, as well as a considerable amount of

stra tegy on the part of their officers."

9

Had i t not been for the

quick action of Japanese reinforcements, the Chinese may have been

successful in taking the railroad station.

The Japanese came up quickly

with bayonets fixed and drove the Chinese back .

10

Though the Chinese did

make concerted efforts to overrun the railroad station, the contro l of

which would have given them a great strategical advantage, they never
made the concen trated effort which could have led to victory over the
foreigners at Tientsin.

The constant shelling, though doing much dam-

age , was not enough to bring victory.

And, as seen, as the days went

by, foreign troop strength continued to increase.
act ually ready to take the offensive themselves.

7
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st r engt h was now centered inside the walls of Tientsin proper.

By

July 11 the re was talk of a conce rted a tta c k by the various foreign
powers on the walled city.

I n fact the Chinese advancement on the

rail r oad station on the e l ev enth caused a postponement of a planned

attack .

11

A council of war made up of generals of the predominant

powers met and it was decided that the attack would be made on July
13.

12

The plan of operation for the attack was for the Russians and

Germans to advance on the east and southeast .

At the same time Ameri-

cans , British, French and Japanese forces were to make a combined

at t ack on the walled city from the south a nd sout hwest. 13
Th e actual at tack commenced ear ly in the morning of July 13.

The

foreign troops which advanced from the south and southwest did so with

great difficulty .

The wall of the native city was well armed by ar -

t illeryme n of the Imperial Chinese army .

In addition, a large number of

Boxers were firing with old-fashioned matchlocks and other obsolete
weapons.

The Chinese regulars were equip ped with quick firing machine

gun s , and European and American made rifles .

The Chinese were also

using an invention of their own ca lled a gingal.

It was an adaptation

of the breach-loading stock joi ned to a seven foot long barrel.

It

took three men to operate one, but the gingal was deadly accurate at

lon g ranges and fired a larger projectile which inflicted huge

14

wound s .
11

12
13

14
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Because he was familiar with the topographic detai l s of the surrounding area, gained from numerous trips on horseback around the city,
Hoover was asked to accompany the approximately 900 Americans as a
guide.

The Americans, who were aligned to the left of the Japanese ,

immediately came under heavy fire from the Chinese positioned on the
city walls.

The Americans were in an area with little cover except for

some mounds which formed old Chinese graves .

Hoover explained that he

was" . .. completely scared, especially when some of the marines next to
me were hit . ••

Hoover was una rmed at first but later was given the

rifle of a fallen marine.

15

The Japanese were in the center of the

attack, flanked on the right by the British.
moved as close to the walls as they could.

By 9:00 a . m. they had
They remained pinned to the

ground by heavy Chinese fire, as did the rest of the foreign contingent
on the south.
again.

As soon as it grew dark the Japanese started forward

By 2:00 a.m. of the fourteenth, they had reached the wall of

Tientsin.

The resistance of the Chinese was very strong, and when the

Japanese troops got so close to the walls that they could not be fired
upon, the Chinese rolled stones a nd threw bricks down on them.

the Japanese troops were engineers who carried explosives.
were carried to help scale the walls.

Among

Ladders

By the time the outer gate of

the city was blown open, Japanese troops had already scaled the walls,
some using ladders, others simply going up by hand.

Before the inne r

gate was blown open, Japanese troops opened it from within. 16
15
16

Hoover, Memoirs , 1:53.
navis , "Looting of Tientsin," p. 74.

As the
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KaL ~s

opened a flood of forei gn troops, Japanese, British and French

poured into the town, bayonetting and shooting the Chinese who still
sniped from inside buildings a nd made a desperate resistance. 17
With the defeat of the Chines e within the walls of the native
city, the entire area of Tientsin was in foreign hands.

The once

thriving community within the walls was now battered beyond recognition,

the result of the heavy shelling the foreigners had inflicted .
matters worse, almost one third of the city was in flames.

thing the foreigners had to do was put out the fires. 18

To make

The first

Shells had

done heavy damage to the structural part of the city and to those living
ther e as well.

Thousands of innocent Chinese were killed.

Bodies

wer e lyin g everywhere, including those of women and small children.
Because native homes were built of extremely flammable material, any

that were hit by shells burst immediately into flames. 19

The foreigners

obviously gave no heed to the protection of civilians.

The fact that they had taken the city, and relieved the danger to
the foreign s ettlements was not enough for the foreigners, neither the

troops nor their leaders.

The Chinese people, who had already paid

heavily in property and lives from the heavy shelling , were forced to
continue paying when the fighting stopped.

Almost as soon as the gates

were thrown open, and foreign troops began pouring in, every article of

17
18
19
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portable property of any value was subject to some of the heaviest
looting as has been seen in history.
The actual taking of private property of the people of Tientsin
took place in several forms.

First, there was some evidence that Chin-

ese troops and Boxers had done some looting refore foreign troops arrived on the scene.

20

Because they were engaged in heavy fighting and

were forced to hurriedly flee upon the entry of the foreigners, it is
quite unlikely that the Boxers or Chinese troops could have taken much.
It is more likely that this charge was used as a sort of salve to the
conscience of the many foreigners who took part in the looting.

The

foreigners had also used as an excuse that the city was on fire and
that the valuables would burn anyway.

21

There was little rationale to

this since by 9:00 a.m. of July 15, the fires were generally under
contro1 .

22

A second and quite common form of looting was carried on

by members of the Chinese working class.

Many of them had been working

for the rich merchants and were paid very little.

They had first-hand

knowledge of where to find goods and therefore had easy access to them .
The streets of the city on July 15 were full of Chinese with arms
loaded with bales of cloth, rolls of beautiful silk, satins, brocades,
coats of silk lined with fur of otter, fox, sable, lamb or mink.

Many

had tied their plunder to the ends of bars, which in turn were carried
across their shoulders.

Some tried to carry a quantity that was ob-

viously much too heavy. 23
20
21
22
23

Lander, China and the Allies, p. 190.
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oavis, "Looting of Tientsin," p. 863.
rbid.
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Into the throngs of Chinese car r ying off goods came ye t another
t yp e of loot er , this in the form of the foreign soldi ers.

The troops

were des cribed as having "rifles with slings over thei r shoulders,

both hands free."

24

The Chinese readily bowed to the demands of the

foreig ner, and gave up any article t he soldier may have wanted.
a soldier could be seen carrying arm loads of valuables.

Many

Severa l had

so much that they were for ced t o stand guard over it while a friend went
to get a cart with which to carry the loot away.
day of July 14, the looting was ca rried on.

Throughout the entire

By the

next day the hi gh-

est o f ficers of the British troops had decided to take all the loot
away from those carrying it into the British sector of the foreign
community .

The roads into the settlement were full of m en brin gi ng

in their plunder.
ing for them .

Many had forced Chinese laborers to do their carry-

The goods were taken away despite the pleas of protest

to be disposed of for the common benefit of all the men engaged in the
captu r e o f the city.

The evening of July 15, the first distribution

was begun, and only the officers were allowed to participate.

25

This

example is typical of the overa ll a ttitud e displayed by the foreigners
toward the Chinese people .

There was total disregard for the feelings

of the Chinese, with the higher officers approving it only in as much
as it be nefitted them.
Because troops of so many nationalities took part in the sack of
Tien tsin, it is interesting to not e which nation's troops took part in

24

Ibid .

ZS ibid., pp. 863-64.
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the looting.

There is overwhelming evidence to support the fact that

men of all nations took part in it.

The s tatemen t best summing this

is, "The soldiers of all nations, none excep ted, disgraced themselves

alike ."

26

noon of

But i t was not only the fore ign soldiers who took part.

By

July 14, many of the civi lians in the foreign city, upon learn -

ing of the capture of Tientsin, ventured into the city.

Many were

quite familiar with the ar ea and were able to find the more valuable
articles to steal.

Many came to recompense themselves for losses they

felt they r ec eived at the hands of the Chinese.

27

They of cour se did

not stop to r eal ize that it was because of their enc roa c hme nt s that the

Chinese attacked in the first place.

The British civilians were sa id

to have be e n more suc cessful looters than the troops, probably because

they knew the location of the more valuable jewelry and large s ums of
money .

28

By the second and third day after the fall of Tientsen, the fever ish pitch of the l ooting had subsided.

Things in the foreign se ttl e-

ment began to retu rn to normal, except that many of the homes a nd build-

i ngs were badly damaged during the seige , and it wo uld take time for
repairs to be made.

The fo rei gn sector was filled with officers and

service men of all nationalities.

I t was described as a city present-

ing "a kaliedascope pictur e of varied uniforms and mixed troops of

many natio ns. "
26
27

28
29

29

Mostly good fellowship prevailed among th e different

La nder, China and the Allies, 1:190- 91.
Davis, "Looting of Tientsin , 11 p. 863.

oix, The Wo rld's Navies, p. 179.

Casserly, The Land of the Boxers , p. 26.
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nationalities.

The bond of a common language drew British and Ameri-

cans quite close together.

Speaking to the Japanese proved to be the

most difficult for those of the other nations because the Japanese
language was so much different.

30

In the suburbs and Tientsin proper , things were very far from
normal.

The immediate concern was to cremate the hund r eds of bodies

of Chinese who had died in the foreign attack.

Prisoners who had been

captured by foreign troops were forced to gather bodies into heaps ,
cover them with doo r s and other materials taken from Chinese houses and

then to set them afire.

31

Those Chinese who were still alive were

forced to either have in their possession home-made flags of one of the
foreign nations or a pass.

Most of the Chinese made simple replicas

of the Japanese flag, since it was easiest to imitate .

U. S. or British flags in their possession.

32

Very few had

Any Chinese found in the

city without a flag or a pass was made prisoner or shot . 33

For days

prisoners were executed, none of whom received any semblance of a trial.

Many were simply villagers who were driven to brigandage because their
house s were burned and a food supply was non-existant.

Others were the

vi ctims of informers, who to gain a small reward, denounced innocent

people .

Often the prisoners were led in gro up s , pigtails tied together,

to the place of execution.

In most cases a Chinese acted as

)Qlbid., pp. 21-22.
31
32
33
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executioner, with white soldiers as witnesses.
the "convicted" were beheaded.

A sword was used, and

34

It is quite obvious that the Chinese people were the real losers
in and around Tientsin during the early part of the Boxer Rebellion.
The foreigners didn't even help those Chinese who were wounded.

Red

Cross workers, who entered Tientsin after the foreign attack, ignored

injured Chinese and many died from want of assistance.

35

Property

losses when all added together were astounding among even the poorer
classes .

Added to this was the fact the means of livelihood of all

classes of Chinese was seriously disrupted.

Even with all these ad -

versities, perhaps the biggest blow of all to a people who had governed
themselves for centuries was the announcement that the foreign generals

had agreed that t hey would govern the city of Tientsin and its vici nity
A telegram from the British Consul to the Marquis of Salisbury, July
17, 1900 told of the meeting of the "allied commanders" who agreed to
appoint a military government.

36

It is this government that forms the

final chapter of foreign dominance in Tientsin.

34
35
36

casserly, The Land of the Boxers, p . 28 .
Lander, China and the Allies, p. 216.

Telegram from Consul Carles to Marquis of Salisbury, 17 July
.1900 in Great Britain Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting the
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CHAPTER V
FOREIGN RULE IN TIENTSIN
The institution that was to become the ruling body of Tientsin
and eventually its surrounding area has been called, "One of the most
remarkable military dictatorships ever organized. "

1

The institution

was the Tientsin Provisional Government or T. P. G. for shor t.

The

government was composed of a council made up of three members, al l
having equal power.

The three members were elected by a vote of

the mili.tary commanders of the allied powers operating in Chihli
Province .

The council derived its authority from all the powers, and

enjoyed absol ute independence in dealing with the territory under its
jurisdiction .

It was pledged to comply as nearly as possible to all

requests addressed to it by either the commanders of the allied forces

or by the consuls representing the foreign powers. 2
In looking at the provisions the T. P. G., it is obvious that

the integrity of China, both of its government and people were totally
ignored.

No respect was shown the Chinese Governmen t.

Though the

foreigners had attacked and defeated a combined Boxer-Government force
in Tientsi n, they had not defeated China.

Yet the T. P. G. was set up

as if China ' s gove rnment had somehow vanished from the earth.

Only the

1
otto D. Rasmussen, Tientsin; An Illustrated Outline Hi story
(Tientsin : The Tientsin Press Limited, 1925), p. 221.
2

Great Britain Foreign Office, Correspondence Respecting Distur -

bances in China, p . 157.
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property of Chinese officials was to be protec ted, but any power those
officials may have had was i gnored.

Consequent l y the people were

pla ced in a position of being subjec ted to a government completely
different from their accustomed form of rule .

The T. P. G. is the

crownin g example of the lack of respec t shown by the foreigners to the
Chinese .

As originally conceived, the T. P . G. had jurisdiction to

include only the area around Tientsin as far as the mud wall.

Excep-

tions were the foreign concessions, and any other organization or

institution previously controlled by foreign powers. 3
The first council of the T. P. G. assembled on July 30, 1900.

The

original council was made up of Colonel Wogack, a Russian, Britain's

Lieutenant Colonel Bower and Colonel Aoki of Japan . 4

Adding insult to

the Chinese, the meeting was held in the palace o r "Yamen " of the

Viceroy of Chihli Province .
T. P. G.

5

By October, 1900, an agreement was reached to add three

members to the
Germany.

The yamen became the headquarters of the

rouncil, one each from France , the United States and

In November the new members took their place on the council.

They were the German Major Von Falkenhayn, French Colonel Arlabosse
and U. S . Major Foote .

Major Foote served only unt il May 10, 1901, when

the withdrawal of United States troops from Tien t sin necessitated his
resignation .
3
4
5

By then another member had been added .

On April 15, 1901,

Ibid .
oecennial Reports, 1892-1901 , pp . 581-82 ,

c.

p. 986 .

L. Poor, "Tientsin Today," Har per's l<eekly , 20 October 1900 ,
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Commander Cassanova was appointed as a representative from Italy. 6

Thus

each of the major powers was eventually represented on the council.
A myriad of problems faced the T. P. G.

It had to deal with the

extreme chaos which resulted from the capture of the native sectors.

Trade, which had been the life line of the city, was virtually at a
standstill.

Shops were void of goods with which to trade, generally

due to the looting that followed the foreign attack.
ties of life were at a premium.
customers a like from the city.

Even the necessi-

Fear had driven most businessmen and
The tremendous struggle to take Tientsin

had resulted in serious health hazards.
ings and streets had been destroyed.

Bodies lay everywhere, build -

The city and its suburbs were

in a serious state of disarray and turmoil. 7

The fact that the T. P. G.

was a foreign military government more difficult to successfully re-

solve .

One of the first things the T. P. G. did was to set up a

police system to maintain order in the area.

Soldiers of the various

foreign powers made up the backbone of the police force.
were added to the force.

8

Many Chinese

The nat ive policemen were stationed about the

city and were to report any serious problems to the foreign police, who

then dispatched troops to take care of the problem.

The native city

was organized into four districts, each district having a foreign cen-

tral police headquarters and a detachment of foreign troops, patrolled
like the Chinese police.

9

The police system was eventually expanded to

6
necennial Reports. 1892-1901, p. 582.
7

8
9

Ibid.
rbid., p. 585.

Poor, "Ti en tsin Today," p. 986.
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include the waterways around Tientsin .
dustry had a lwa ys been a problem.

Thievery in the shipping in-

To combat it, sixty Chinese police-

men and about the same number of Italian sailors were appointed to

patrol the waterways.
Italian navy.

All were under the command of a captain of the

10

Another early thrust of fue T. P. G. was a campaign to clean up
and fix up the city and to give it a better system of drainage.

In an

attempt to improve the pitiful conditions of the Chinese in Tientsin,
almshouses were established and some aid was provided to Chinese who

could not make their livings the way they had before the foreign takeove r.

Some were put to work by the T. P. G. in jobs designed to aid

in the clean-up of the city and to build the new drainage faciliti es .
Street improvemen ts were also an endeavor undertaken by the T. P. G.

Along the banks of the Peiho and Grand Canal, a wide, paved boulevard
was const ructed.

The new road offered excellent accommodations for

traffic to and from the city.
round the city.

A wide thoroughfare was also built a-

The two existing main roads of the town were widened

and straightened, and many lesser roads were improved.

The T. P. G.

also was responsible for the installation of a new system of water
works.

Chinese and foreign capitalists were granted a franchise to in-

stall and operate the new system.
ditions to the franchise .
vals of 225 meters.

Fire hydrants had to be installed at inter-

The price of the water could not exceed that of

the native city of Shanghai.
10

The T. P. G. attached several con-

Also a filtering system had to be

oecennial Reports , 1892-1901, p. 585.
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installed and maintained.

The result was a clear water surply that the

natives had never known before.

11

Though the improvements were bene-

ficial to the Chinese, it is obvious that many were undertaken to aid
the foreign interests in Tientsin.

An example is the

improvement made

on roads which were to facilitate the movement of trade goods in and
about Tientsin.

The degree of authority which the T. P. G. held over the Chinese
people is evident in the judicial power in Tientsin .

The T. P. G. had

the power to inflict fines upon the natives, confisca te their property

and punish them with banishment or death.

12

The police made up largely

of foreigners could make the arrests, and the cases were heard in

courts presided over by foreigners.

There is little wonder that at

first the Chinese were terrified by the T. P. G. and that they dis trusted it.

13

foreign powers.

But the T . P. G. quite early won the confidence of the
As early as November 1900, the council applied for and

received an extension to its jurisdiction.

The council extended the

territorial limits of the T. P. G. in a decree which stated:
The jurisdiction of the council shall extend over the city
of Tientsin, and over the surrounding territories where the

estab lishment of the Provisional Government shal l appear necessary to assure the security of the city of Tien tsin, to complete
the public works, to maintain the commun ications by the rivers
and canals, to protect the markets where the city of Tientsin
secures its provisions, and to protect goods in transit to and

from the interior .l4
11
12

rbid .• pp . 584-8 5.
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13
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The council thereby extended its rule to include a strip of country
on both sides of the Peiho, from the Gulf of Pechili to a line about
twenty-five kilometers to the west and northwest of Tientsin.

The

entire area was divided into five districts, of which Tientsin was one .

The four outlying districts were each placed under control of a military officer who had the designation of Chief of the District .

The

chiefs of the four districts organized and superintended a staff independent of that of the metropolitan district.

The chief of the dis-

trict wielded more nearly absolute power than any one official within

the city, although he was at all times under the orders of the T. P. G.
Council.

15

Thus the scope of the foreign control was expanded to in-

el ude a much larger area and many more Chinese were forced to live
under the rule of a foreign power.

One of the most unpopular actions of the T . P. G. was its decision
to carry out the demolition of the wall surrounding the native city.

The Chinese natives strenuously opposed this action .

Leaders of the

gentry class petitioned the 1'. P. G. to leave the wall so that they
would not be subjected to the disgrace of living in a city without a
The reason the T . P. G. gave for wanting to tear the wall down

wall.

were military and hygienic.

The contention was that the wall was in

such a location that the foreign concessions were always in a position

to be threatened by gunfire from the wa11.

16

Also, many Chinese were

living near the wall in wretched lean-to huts, which the T. P. G.
15
16

Ibid.
rbid . , p. 584.
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wanted to remove.

The demolition of the wall was a gigantic task but

was carried out with surprising speed.

Once the Chinese accepted the

fact that the wall was coming down, they caused few problems to the
completion of the project.

17

Nevertheless it was another example of

the foreign powers ignoring the traditions of the Chinese people to
promote their own causes.

The people living near the wall were com-

pensated with lots in the western part of the city. 18

They were not,

however, given any means with which to build a shelter on their new

land.

The result was that they lost what little shelter they had had

before.

It is obvious that the tearing down of the wall was a reaction

to the experiences of the seige.

One cannot help but suspect a degree

of punitiveness on the part of the T. P. G.

The hygienic reason for

tearing the wall down was particularly weak, as the run-down shacks

could have been removed without demolishing the entire wall.
To run as extensive a program as the T. P. G. meant the necessity
of large amounts of funds.

The income of the gove rnment was derived

chiefly from domestic duties that it imposed.
goods coming to and from Tientsin.

These included dues on

House taxes, plus the sale of

shop and boat licenses helped provide funds.

19

Although as early as

June 1901, there was some movement to end T. P. G. rule, many Chinese
had come to accept the new government.

17
18
19

Many Chinese in the gentry

Tientsin and Peking Times, 15 June 1901, p. 22.
rbid.

necennial Reports, 1892-1901, p. 584.
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class and many traders, who had benefitted financially from T. P. G.
measures, urged that the T. P. G. continue its rule. 20

There were also

some Chinese who criticized the T. P. G. as being too lenient in deal ing with criminals.

Most ruffians were sentenced to hard labor, and it

was felt by some that a more severe punishment was in order. 21

By mid -

year 1902, the programs initiated by the T. P. G. were either completed
or well underway.

Tientsin and its surroundings had returned to normal,

and it became increasingly obvious that the T. P. G. was beginning to

outlive its usefulness.

Thus, August 15, 1902 the T. P. G. cond ucted

its final meeting and its power was returned to Chinese authority. 22
The terms under which the T. P. G. transferred its power presented
some rather delicate problems.

It must be kept in mind

fuat this

power had been the creation of military men in occupation of Chinese

territory.

The problem facing the T. P. G. was how to resolve the

fact that its actions of over two years should be recognized by
Chinese authority, when the Chines e again took cont rol of Tientsin .

Persons who had assisted the government had to be protected from any
natural resentment that Chinese authorities may have held for them.
Also the T. P. G. wanted to insure that works begun by it would be continued by the Chinese.

These were the crucial points to be negotiated

in releasing the T. P. G. from power.

23

The foreign powers dealt with

the Chinese concerning the points of negotiation by extending the
20
21
22
23

Tientsin and Peking Times, 15 June 1901, p. 22.
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fiction that the foreign powers had never been at war wit h China , but

were only an i nt e rnal uprising.

The T. P . G. looked upon itself as

simply a means to which this was partially accomplished .

Using this

logic, the powers attempted to get the approval of it s actions by the
Chinese authority.
The exact proposal of the council "for the rendition of the government to the Chinese authorities" were as follows:

Given that the Allied Powers have always maintained that
they have not been at war with China, the Provisional Govern-

ment ought to be regarded as having acted for the Chinese
Government, and the Chinese Government ought to recognize the
validity of all of its acts, as if they have been done in the
name of the Imperial Chinese Autho r ities themselves.24
The Chines e were in no position to quarrel, no matter how hypocritical
the proposition may have been.

To regain their sovereignty from the

foreign powers was their objective.

Thus the T. P. G. disbanded leav-

ing the 2,758,651. 18 of Chinese taels that were left in the T. P. G.
treasu r y t o the Chinese authorities.

25

What effect did the T . P. G. have on Tientsin?

There is little

doubt that it did bring some physical and economic ben efits to the
vicinity .

living.

Many Chinese certainly received some improvements in their

Yet there is little doubt that the T . P. G. caused se rious

psyc holo gical damage to the Chinese people in and a round Tientsin, who
for over two years were forced to live under the authority of a foreign
power .

There was certain to be a resulting la:::k of confidence in the

old order to control the destiny of China.
24
25

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 588.

And though the T. P. G.
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did not actively participate, its rule coincided with the greatest land
grab by foreign powers near Tientsin in Chinese history .

If one ac -

cepts the T. P. G.'s own proposition that it "acted for the Chinese

Government" in Tientsin, then full responsibility for the land grab

must be placed on its shoulders.

Ulterior motives of the European

countries developed as early as November 1900.

Russia and Belgium were

proposing extensions of their concessions, and later Germany , France

and Austria did the same.

Japan also got into the act. 26

Americans

denounced this as a "grab game,•• but U . S. Minister to China, E. H.

Conger , acknowledged that it would be, "Advanta geous to us in many ways
to have an American concession at Tien tsin."

He admitted, however ,

that it wasn't practical because the United States had too few citizens

and too little money in the area.

27

Thus the United States took the

role of guardian of Chinese territorial integrity.

Its efforts were

of little consequence in the vicinity of Tientsin, as by the end of

February 1901, all available land around Tientsin had been seized
by the land hungry powers, except for a small tract that had once formed
the American concession.

28

The T . P. G. obviously did little to act in

the interest of the Chinese even though i t was supposedly acting "for
the Chinese Government."

It is inconceivable that one can truthfully

say that the T. P. G. was good for China.

On the contrary , it did very

26
Paul H. Clements, The Boxer Rebellion; A Political and Diplomatic Review ( NEoW York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1915; reprint ed.,
New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1967) , pp . 164-65 .
27
u. S. Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1901 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1902), p. 40.
28
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little for Chjna, and has to be looked upon as a detriment to the continuation of China in its old tradition.
The actual ceremonies of the transfer of authority was made on

August 15 , 1902.

A huge, official function was made of the transfer.

Yuan Shih-kai, who had become the Viceroy of Chihli Province, was present.

The allied generals who authorized the transfer were French

General Lefevre, Major General Rorsheidt of Germany, Major General
Creagh of Britain , Japanese General Akiyama, and Lieutenant Colonel

Ameylio of Italy.

Several Chinese officials were present to be in

charge of the proceedings for the Empire.
G., China again ruled Tientsin.

29

With the end of the T. P.

But the T. P. G. ' s effects were to

be felt for many years to come, most of which were negative to China
rather than positive.

29

Rasmussen, Tientsin; An Illustrated Outline History, p. 230.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUS ION

The great trading that was once so prominent in Tientsin was

thoroughly disrupted by the events of 1900.

The loss in trade by the

United States, one of the lesser trading powers, was described as
"almost inculcuable."

1

The Chinese, though losing the battle in

Tientsin, had seriously disrupted the major foreig n influence in
Tientsin.

The fact that the trade was of so much importance to the

powe rs goes far in explaining why the foreigners were willing to fight
so fiercely to win victory.

Once the seige had been raised, it would

have been a simple matter to remove the consular officials, mission-

aries , businessmen and all others who were placed in jeopardy by the
Chinese.

The powers, however, seemed interested only in protecting

their trade and extending the control they already held i n China.
The powers on the surface appeared to cooperate well with each
other and act as one unit , the fact remains that there was little trust

held for each other.

The British and Russians were particularly sus~

picious and envious of each other.

Japan was also wary of the Russian

moves in the area of Tientsin , and saw them as an attempted chaos there .

Japan felt this chaos would aid Russias advances in China. 2

The United

1
u. S. Congress, House, Commercial Relations of the United States
with Foreign Countries During the Year 1901, H. Doc. 320, 57th Cong.,
2d sess . , p. 805.
2

Thompson, China and the Allies, pp. 140-41.
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States, though seeming to be the protectora te of Chinese integrity,

looked somewhat longingly at a possible concession in Tientsin.

With

so many powers with roots in Tientsin, it was inconceivable that there
would be a mass pullout, as none of the powers was willing to see

another make gains at its own expense.
The real losers in this power struggle were the Chinese.

The

defeat of its army in Tientsin was a serious blow to the prestige of
its government, as was the establishment of the Tientsin Provisional

Government.

But it was the people of Tientsin who suffered most.

loss of lives and property was astounding.

The

Seldom were the Chinese

peasants treated with any respect by the foreigners.

Shells were

lobbed with no heed as to whether they landed m a military objective
or a peasant's hut.

There was indiscriminate shooting both during the

seige and in the capture of Tientsin City.

only a mere semblance of a trial.

People were executed with

The T. P. G. helped the area in

many respects, yet its major motive was restoration of the trade that

had once flourished in the area.

And during its rule, China lost

more land to the powers in the vicinity of Tientsin than at any pre-

vious time.

Little respect was shown the Chinese government except

in those cases where it would have been a benefit to the foreign cause .

These are the major conclusions that can be drawn from the study
of TientsJn in 1900.

It is evident that these situations existed be-

fore, during and after what took place in Tientsin during the year

1900.
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General Regulations for the Administration of the City of Tientsin
THE town of Tien-tsin having been occupied by the allied troops,
it has been decided to constitute a Provisional Administration under

t:he form of "Council of the Provisional Government of the Chinese city
of Tien-tsin."

The jurisdiction of this Council will extend over the city of
Tien-tsin itself and over the surrounding territories as far as the
mud wall, with the exception of-1. The foreign Concessions: German, English, French, and Japanese
2. The arsenals, camps, railways, telegraphs, and other military

institutions already occupied by the allied troops.
The Provisional Government will deal with the following questions:
1. The re-establishment of order and security within the boundaries of the city on the territory subject to their jurisdiction.
2.

The ordering of sanitary measures in the city, on this terri-

tory, and in the surrounding country, in order to prevent epidemic
and other diseases.

3.

They will facilitate the quartering

of the allied forces,

and will procure them provisions and means of transport, beasts of
burden, carts, boats, coolies, &c.

4.

They will draw up an inventory of, and will take the measures

necessary for preserving, the moveable and immoveable property belonging to the Chinese Government, as well as that of private individuals

left behind by them.
5. They will take measures to prevent famine among the natives .
The Provisional Government will be represented by a Council com-

posed of three members enjoying equal rights, elected by a meeting of
the Military Commanders of the allied Powers operating in Pechili.
The Council, deriving its authority from all the Powers, will
enjoy absolute independence on the territory confided to it, and will
comply as far as possible with all requests addressed to it either by
the Commanders of the allied forces or by the Cons uls of the foreign
Powers.
In case of a difference of opinion arising between the Council and

one of the Commanders of the allied forces, or between the Council and
one of the Consuls, the question will be submitted to the arbitration
of the assembled Commanders of the allied forces or to that of the
Consular Body, accordi ng to the character of the dispute. If an arrangement cannot be come to by this procedure the difference will be
submi tt ed to the decision of their respective Governments.

The Council will have the right
1. To draw up and publish Regulations upon questions interesting
the Provisional Government.
2. To impose upon the natives duti es , taxes, and contributions ,
and to collect the taxes due to the Chinese Government.

3. To seize or take under its control all the securities, as well
as the documents which shall be found in the Government buildings and
in private houses deserted by their owners.
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4. To make use, according to its requirements, of all the moveable
property belonging to the Government , with the exception of that belonging to the Military Administration, and to proceed to the sale of
the confiscated personal and real pro perty of the native inhabitants .
5. To employ the sums placed at the disposal of the Council for
the necessary expenditure.
It is understood that an advance of funds shall be made to the
Council by the Powers to which the members of the Provisional Government belong, with a view to meet the first expenditure before the
finances of the city have been put in order. The sums will be repaid
out of the first money available from the collection of taxes and dues.
Besides their rights of poli ce , the Provisional Government will also be
invested with the judicial power, They will, in consequence , be able
to inflict fines upon the natives, to confiscate their goods, and, if
necessary, punish them with banishment or the death penalty. As regards
foreigners, both military and civilian, t he Council will only exercise
polic e rights over them. Foreigners who contravene the Regulation s will
be arrested, a nd a record of their examination will be drawn up immediately. They will then, within twen ty-four hours, be handed over to
their own military or Consular autorities.
The Provi sional Government will be assisted, under their control,
by the following Departments, which will be under their control:
1. General chancery of the Council .
2 . Police Department.
3 . Sanitary Department .
4. Treasury.
5 . Administration of the property of the Government as well as
of th a t abandoned by private persons .
6 . Military section .
7. Judi cia l section.
8. Office of public food suppl ie s.
Besides these general Departments each member of the Council has
a private office.
The functions of each of thes e Depa r tments are defined by their
designations. As regards the details of the Depar t men t, they will be
determined by special instructions of the Council .
Each administrative section is c omposed of a Head of Department
and of such a numbe r of employes as may be required .
The personnel of the Administration may be chosen among soldiers
and c ivilians.
All persons attac hed to the service of a foreig n Gover nmen t who
shall be members of the Administration of Tien - tsin will keep their
present posts , as well as the additional salary, in the same pr oportions as t hat allotted to those who a r e members of t he Provisional
Government without occ upying an official position.
There will be t hree categories of sa l aries, according to t he
position of fue f unctionaries:
Head of Departmen t , 800l. a-year.
Depu ty head or assistants, 600 l . a - yea r .
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Secondary employes , 300 Z. a-year
The salaries of the nat ive pers onnel will be fixed by the Council.
Tien- tsin, the lOth (23rd) July, 19001

1
Fr om Great Britain Foreign Office , Correspondence Respec ting
the Disturbances in China (London: Harrison and Sons, 1961), pp. 15759 .

